Evidence of a health risk 'signalling effect' following the introduction of a sugar-sweetened beverage tax. by Alvarado, Miriam et al.
Food Policy 102 (2021) 102104
Available online 5 June 2021
0306-9192/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Evidence of a health risk ‘signalling effect’ following the introduction of a 
sugar-sweetened beverage tax 
Miriam Alvarado a,*, Tarra L. Penney a,b, Nigel Unwin c,d,e, Madhuvanti M. Murphy e, 
Jean Adams a 
a Centre for Diet and Activity Research, MRC Epidemiology Unit, University of Cambridge School of Clinical Medicine, Box 285 Institute of Metabolic Science, Cambridge 
Biomedical Campus, Cambridge CB2 0QQ, United Kingdom 
b Global Health Program, Faculty of Health, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Canada 
c Global Diet and Activity Research, MRC Epidemiology Unit, University of Cambridge School of Clinical Medicine, Box 285 Institute of Metabolic Science, Cambridge 
Biomedical Campus, Cambridge CB2 0QQ, United Kingdom 
d European Centre for Environment and Human Health, University of Exeter Medical School, Knowledge Spa, Royal Cornwall Hospital, Truro, Cornwall TR1 3HD, United 
Kingdom 
e George Alleyne Chronic Disease Research Centre, Caribbean Institute for Health Research, The University of the West Indies, Bridgetown, Barbados   






A B S T R A C T   
Consuming sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) has been associated with increased rates of obesity and type 2 
diabetes, making SSBs an increasingly popular target for taxation. In addition to changing prices, the intro-
duction of an SSB tax may convey information about the health risks of SSBs (a signalling effect). If SSB taxation 
operates in part by producing a health risk signal, there may be important opportunities to amplify this effect. 
Our aim was to assess whether there is evidence of a risk signalling effect following the introduction of the 
Barbados SSB tax. We used process tracing to assess the existence of a signalling effect around sodas and sugar- 
sweetened juices (juice drinks). We used three data sources: 611 archived transcripts of local television news, 30 
interviews with members of the public, and electronic point of sales data (46 months) from a major grocery store 
chain. We used directed content analysis to assess the qualitative data and an interrupted time series analysis to 
assess the quantitative data. We found evidence consistent with a risk signalling effect following the introduction 
of the SSB tax for sodas but not for juice drinks. Consistent with risk signalling theory, the findings suggest that 
consumers were aware of the tax, believed in a health rationale for the tax, understood that sodas were taxed and 
perceived that sodas and juice drinks were unhealthy. However consumers appear not to have understood that 
juice drinks were taxed, potentially reducing tax effectiveness from a health perspective. In addition, the tax may 
have incentivised companies to increase advertising around juice drinks (undermining any signalling effect) and 
to introduce low-cost SSB product lines. Policymakers can maximize the impact of risk signals by being clear 
about the definition of taxed SSBs, emphasizing the health rationale for introducing such a policy, and intro-
ducing co-interventions (e.g. marketing restrictions) that reduce opportunities for industry countersignals. These 
actions may amplify the impact of an SSB tax.   
1. Introduction 
Sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxation has been recommended as 
a response to the obesity epidemic (Waqanivalu and Nederveen, 2015). 
The dominant economic theory around SSB taxation suggests that the 
introduction of a tax increases prices, which in turn dampens demand 
and leads to a reduction in sales of taxed products (Mytton et al., 2014). 
However, it has also been hypothesised that the introduction of an SSB 
tax may have a ‘signalling effect’ by conveying additional information 
that prompts behaviour change (Mytton et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2018; 
Álvarez-Sánchez et al., 2018; Brockwell, 2013; Cornelsen and Smith, 
2018; Leicester, 2012; Landon and Graff, 2012). If SSB taxation operates 
(in part) through a signalling effect, there may be important opportu-
nities to amplify this effect. Cornelsen et al. highlight the importance of 
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understanding “the mechanisms of change in current, implemented, 
taxes and the role of framing the taxes […] in combination with price 
changes” (Cornelsen and Smith, 2018). We use the expressive function 
of law theory to assess signalling as a potential mechanism of change 
(McAdams, 2015). 
1.1. Theory: The expressive function of law 
McAdams writes in The Expressive Powers of Law that laws not only 
function through sanctions but can also “convey or ‘signal’ information, 
which affects beliefs and behaviour” (McAdams, 2015). We summarise 
key elements of this theory below, and then identify implications for SSB 
taxation. 
First, the public must be aware of a law for it to have a potential 
signalling effect (McAdams, 2015). Second, the way in which the public 
interprets a law is important. As McAdams elaborates: “Law is not 
informative […] if they know the law exists, but significantly misun-
derstand its content” (McAdams, 2015). Third, the ways in which people 
interpret a law may vary across sub-groups. Finally, the expressive 
function of law may operate counter to the law’s original intent (McA-
dams, 2015). 
Risk signalling is a particular type of expressive signal, and the 
strength of a risk signal may be amplified or diminished depending on 
the public’s perception of lawmakers’ interests. In addition, risk signals 
may change behaviour both directly (through altered risk perception) 
and indirectly (through changed social norms). A direct effect may be 
seen, for example, when a ban on smoking in public places signals new 
information about risks, leading some smokers to change their behav-
iour (McAdams, 2015). The same ban could also have an indirect effect, 
by encouraging non-smokers to be more vocal about their disapproval of 
smoking behaviour (McAdams, 2015). 
This theory has several implications for SSB taxation. First, any risk 
signal would only apply to the products that consumers perceive as 
being subject to the tax. Second, the introduction of an SSB tax may be 
associated with countersignals, such as industry messaging. Third, if 
lawmakers are perceived to have implemented the SSB tax despite in-
dustry opposition, this may strengthen the risk signal (and vice versa). 
Finally, a risk signal may have direct and indirect effects, by 1) incen-
tivizing consumers to reduce consumption out of concern for their 
health and 2) encouraging others to voice disapproval of SSB con-
sumption more strongly. 
1.2. A case study: The Barbados sugar-sweetened beverage tax 
We considered the case of the Barbados SSB tax, a 10% tax on 
sweetened beverages which was initially announced by the Minister of 
Finance as part of the budgetary presentation (Sinckler, 2015). The 
Minister of Finance cited high levels of diabetes and the need “to 
encourage healthier consumption patterns of our people as it relates to 
the consumption of sweetened beverages” as the rationale for the tax 
(Sinckler, 2015). According to a nationally representative survey con-
ducted between 2012 and 2013, adult SSB consumption was more than 
four times the global average (Alvarado et al., 2020) and the prevalence 
of diabetes was double the global average (Howitt et al., 2015). 
There was limited or no public discussion of an SSB tax in the lead-up 
to announcement (personal communication, August 22, 2017). The tax 
was announced on June 15th, 2015 and initially planned to take effect 
on August 1st, 2015, six weeks after being announced (Sinckler, 2015). 
However, implementation was subsequently delayed to September 2015 
(personal communication, January 4, 2017). 
We previously evaluated the impact of the tax and found that the 
10% tax was associated with a 5.9% increase in the price of SSBs overall 
(Alvarado et al., 2017) and a 4.3% drop in sales, (Alvarado et al., 2019) 
based on data from one major grocery store chain. 
Our aim in this study was to assess whether there is evidence of a risk 
signalling effect following the introduction of the Barbados SSB tax. 
2. Methods 
We used process tracing (PT) to evaluate each component of the 
Fig. 1. Expressive function of law theory applied to sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxation for sodas and juice drinks separately a, b a Note that price change 
represents another mechanism through which the introduction of an SSB tax may influence SSB sales. b Numbers 1–5 correspond to testable components of the 
theory; ‘X’ corresponds to the hypothesized cause and ‘Y’ corresponds to the outcome. 
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proposed theory. We present results in terms of updated posterior be-
liefs, following process tracing best-practice (Beach and Process- 
Tracing, 2019). 
2.1. Process tracing as a method 
Process tracing is appropriate for single case studies when the 
research aim is to investigate the presence of a hypothesised causal 
mechanism in an effort to understand “how and why an intervention led 
to change” (Beach and Process-Tracing, 2019; Bennett and Checkel, 
2014; Punton and Welle, 2015). Process tracing was initially used by 
psychologists to investigate individual and collective decision-making 
and later applied in political science (Trampusch and Palier, 2016; 
George and Lauren, 1979; Ford et al., 1989). More recently, process 
tracing has been applied in several public health evaluations. For 
example, Bamanyaki and Holvoet used process tracing to assess gender- 
responsive budgeting interventions and maternal health service delivery 
in rural Uganda (Bamanyaki and Holvoet, 2016) and te Lintelo et al. 
used process tracing to evaluate the impact of the Hunger and Nutrition 
Commitment Index on international commitments in Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Malawi and Zambia (te Lintelo et al., 2016). 
The detailed steps and inferential logic of process tracing have been 
described extensively elsewhere (Beach and Process-Tracing, 2019; 
Fairfield and Charman, 2017). Briefly, we identified risk signalling 
(McAdams, 2015) as a plausible mechanism linking the introduction of 
an SSB tax with reductions in SSB sales (Alvarado et al., 2019). We 
operationalised this theory to apply to SSB taxation (Fig. 1). 
We identified the two most commonly consumed SSBs in the 
Barbados population: sodas and juice drinks (Alvarado et al., 2020). We 
assessed the existence of an expressive risk signal around sodas and juice 
Table 1 
Predicted empirical evidence and test types.  
Hypotheses (h) Prior p(h) Part Means of 
Verification 
Predicted Empirical Evidence (e) Test Type 
(1) The public is aware of the 
SSB tax 
Likely, given evidence of SSB tax 
awareness in other settings, e.g. 65% 
awareness in Mexico, (Álvarez- 
Sánchez et al., 2018) 68% in 
Berkeley, US (Falbe et al., 2016). 
1a Interviews with 
members of the 
public 
Participants report being aware 
of the tax, and can describe 
details (e.g. when/how they 
heard about the tax, how it was 
introduced, etc.) 
Hoop 
Finding e does not necessarily 
confirm h given potential bias of 
participants to report awareness 
Not finding e disconfirms h   
1b Archived media 
data 
Major news sources cover the tax, 
providing a plausible mechanism 
for the public to have learned 
about the policy 
Hoop 
Finding e does not necessarily 
confirm h given potential bias of 
participants to report awareness/ 
news consumption 
Not finding e disconfirms h given 
the news is likely to be the main 
channel through which people 
learn about government actions 
(2) Members of the public 
believe that the tax was 
introduced for health reasons 
Agnostic 2a Interviews with 
members of the 
public 
Participants report that the tax 
was introduced because of the 
health risks of SSBs 
Doubly Decisive 
Finding e confirms h, 
Not finding e disconfirms h 
(3) Members of the public 
understand which products are 
taxed 
Agnostic 3a Interviews with 
members of the 
public 
Participants report that the tax is 
applied on sodas and/or juice 
drinks 
Doubly Decisive 
Finding e confirms h, 
Not finding e disconfirms h 
(4) Members of the public 
increase their perception of the 
health risks of SSBs because of 
the tax 
Likely, given evidence of increased 
newspaper coverage of SSBs as 
unhealthy in Barbados (Singh-Lalli, 
2015). 
4a Interviews with 
members of the 
public 
Participants mention health risks 
of sodas and/or juice drinks 
Hoop 
Finding e does not necessarily 
confirm h given that participants 
may be aware of health risks of 
sodas and/or juices for reasons 
unrelated to the tax 
Not finding e disconfirms h   
4b Interviews with 
members of the 
public 
Participants mention increasing 
their perception of the health 
risks of sodas and/or juice drinks 
because of the tax 
Smoking Gun 
Finding e confirms h, 
Not finding e does not necessarily 
disconfirm h given that 
participants may not report this so 
directly (or even be consciously 
aware of it)   
4c Archived media 
data 
News media coverage of SSBs as 
unhealthy increases following 
introduction of the tax 
Hoop 
Finding e does not necessarily 
confirm h given that people may 
not have seen the news or updated 
their beliefs based on it 
Not finding e disconfirms h 
(5) Members of the public buy 
fewer SSBs based on new 
information about health risks 
(direct effect) or social norms 
(indirect effect) 
Agnostic 5a Electronic point of 
sale data from a 
major grocery store 
chain 
Sales of taxed sodas and/or juice 
drinks decrease over time 
Hoop 
Finding e does not necessarily 
confirm h given that other 
mechanisms could explain the 
decrease (e.g. price changes due to 
the tax) 
Not finding e disconfirms h   
5b Electronic point of 
sale data from a 
major grocery store 
chain 
Sales of soda/juice drinks 
decrease post-tax, despite no tax- 
driven increases in price, OR 
Sales of soda/juice drinks do not 
decrease post-tax, despite tax- 
driven increases in price 
Hoop 
Finding e does not necessarily 
confirm h given that other 
mechanisms could explain the 
decrease/lack of decrease 
Not finding e disconfirms h 
Note: e: evidence; h: hypothesis that part of a causal mechanism exists; p(h): probability of the hypothesis being true. 
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drinks separately, driven by the hypothesis that the risk signal produced 
by a tax may vary by product type. We refer to sugar-sweetened 
carbonated drinks (with less than 71 mg caffeine per 12 fl. oz. (Reissig 
et al., 2009; Kole and Barnhill, 2013)) as ‘sodas,’ drinks containing fruit 
juice and added sugar as ‘juice drinks,’ and unsweetened juices as ‘no- 
added sugar juice’ (or ‘NAS juice’). Sodas and juice drinks are taxed 
under the Barbados SSB tax while NAS juices are not. 
For each component of the theorised causal mechanism in Fig. 1, we 
summarized our prior beliefs based on existing theory, empirical studies 
and case-specific knowledge (Table 1) (Beach and Process-Tracing, 
2019). We then developed a priori predictions by specifying what we 
would expect to find if each component of the causal mechanism had 
operated (Table 1). 
We assessed the probability of finding each piece of evidence if the 
hypothesis was true, compared to the probability of finding the same 
evidence if the hypothesis was not true and used this to identify process 
tracing test types. Briefly, Schmitt and Beach define four test types: 
straw-in-the-wind tests have low sensitivity and low specificity; doubly- 
decisive tests have high sensitivity and high specificity; hoop tests have a 
high false positive rate (low specificity); while smoking gun tests have a 
high false negative (low sensitivity) (Schmitt and Beach, 2015). 
We aimed to specify a test or combination of tests that would allow 
us to confirm and/or disconfirm each component of the theory, as 
summarised in Table 1. Where we were only able to identify hoop tests, 
we developed multiple tests noting that they can, in combination, 
strengthen confidence in a causal hypothesis (Schmitt and Beach, 2015). 
When we were able to identify doubly decisive tests, no other tests were 
necessary given the strong confirmatory and disconfirmatory power of 
this doubly decisive test. 
We analysed relevant data for each test, considering potential biases 
and limitations in each dataset. We then assessed each component of the 
hypothesised theory by evaluating the associated empirical tests, guided 
by test type and prior beliefs. If a test provided evidence in support of 
(against) a component of the theory we upgraded (downgraded) our 
prior belief accordingly. Finally, we updated the original theory to 
reflect our posterior belief in each component of the theory. 
2.2. Data and analytical methods for empirical tests 
We used three pre-existing data sources: archived transcripts of local 
television news, interviews with members of the public conducted as 
part of a public acceptability study and electronic point of sale data from 
a major grocery store chain. 
2.2.1. Local news television transcripts 
We reviewed transcripts of local televised evening news program-
ming from June 15, 2014 (one year prior to announcement of the 
Barbados SSB tax) to July 31, 2017 (2 + years after tax announcement). 
The Caribbean Broadcast Corporation (CBC) is the only televised local 
news programme in Barbados, and some CBC Evening News pro-
grammes have been uploaded to the video-sharing website Youtube. 
com. Televised news footage was available on 639 of the 1,143-day 
period (56%). Automated text transcriptions were available for all but 
28 videos, for a total of 611 news-days (see Appendix Figure A1 for more 
details). Overall, weekend days were underrepresented and a greater 
proportion of news-days were available in later years. However, we were 
not able to identify any systematic pattern in online availability of news 
programming (other than day of week) which would be likely to sys-
tematically bias news content. To address the variable number of news- 
days available over time, we focused our analysis on changes in the 
proportion of total observed days in each month over time. 
Transcripts were analysed using a directed approach to qualitative 
content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). The initial coding scheme 
was determined by the theory, and included codes such as “SSB tax 
covered in news” and “SSBs portrayed as unhealthy,” which were 
reviewed by a senior qualitative researcher (MM). We conducted an 
initial text keyword search for terms related to SSBs. All results were 
reviewed and coded, and we explored whether new codes should be 
developed to capture additional emergent themes. The coded transcripts 
were then analysed to assess the extent to which they provided con-
firming or disconfirming evidence of the relevant empirical tests (1b,4c). 
To assess the frequency of news coverage over time, coded news-days 
were displayed as a proportion of total observed days in each month 
over time. All transcripts were coded and analysed in Nvivo 12 Pro, and 
graphical displays were produced in Stata 14.0 (StataCorp., 2015). 
2.2.2. Public acceptability Interviews 
In total, 30 participants were recruited for a public acceptability 
study. Twenty of these participants were recruited from the Health of the 
Nation (HotN) study, a cross-sectional study conducted between 2012 
and 2013 in Barbados. Further details of the original HotN study have 
been published elsewhere (Howitt et al., 2015). Participants were 
identified using a stratified sampling procedure based on age, gender 
and parish of residence. Since the HotN sampling frame did not include 
participants under the age of 30, ten additional participants between the 
ages of 18–29 were recruited from a popular local shopping mall. A 
trained investigator (AF) led semi-structured interviews with each 
participant around general tax knowledge, views on taxation, and views 
on the Barbados SSB tax. Written informed consent was obtained from 
all participants prior to the interview. Interviews lasted 30 min or less, 
were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim, and were conducted be-
tween March 2017-July 2017. Ethics approval was given by the 
Research Ethics Committee of the University of the West Indies and 
Barbados’ Ministry of Health. 
Transcripts were analysed using a directed approach and a coding 
scheme developed from the theory. All transcripts were read initially, 
then re-read and coded according to the coding scheme. New codes were 
added to capture emergent themes. The coded transcripts were then 
analysed to assess the extent to which they provided confirming or 
disconfirming evidence of the relevant empirical tests. All transcripts 
were coded and analysed in Nvivo 12 Pro. 
2.2.3. Electronic point of sale data 
Previously, we assessed trends in sales of carbonated SSBs and non- 
carbonated SSBs using electronic point of sale data from a major grocery 
store chain which represented 32% of the grocery store market share in 
Barbados (personal communication). Data on weekly unit and dollar 
sales were provided for 1,161 unique size-specific non-alcoholic bever-
ages over 200 weeks, covering the period from January 1, 2013 to 
October 31, 2016 (including 59 post-tax weeks) (Alvarado et al., 2019). 
Products were categorized (e.g. as SSBs vs. non-SSBs and as sodas, sugar- 
sweetened juice drinks, no-added sugar juices, etc.) based on product 
descriptions which were provided in the original dataset and supple-
mented by a manual search for product information on manufacturers’ 
websites and in-store assessments of specific products (Alvarado et al., 
2019). 
We used an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis and, after con-
trolling for pre-existing trends and time-varying confounders, estimated 
a 4.3% decline in sales of SSBs following the introduction of the 
Barbados SSB tax (Alvarado et al., 2019). In this study, we re-analysed 
trends for soda and juice drinks specifically (our prior categories were 
broader, e.g. ‘carbonated SSBs’ included highly caffeinated energy 
drinks and ‘other SSBs’ included sweetened flavoured waters, sports 
drinks, etc). Additional details on the original analysis are available 
elsewhere (Alvarado et al., 2019). 
Previously, we showed that the year-on-year mean price per litre of 
SSBs increased in the two quarters following tax implementation, while 
the price of non-SSBs did not change (Alvarado et al., 2017). In this 
study, we used a longer time series and revised methodology to assess 
changes in price in more detail. We conducted ITS analyses separately 
for soda and juice drinks, using all products with non-missing data over 
the period from January 2013 to October 2016. We anticipated that 
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prices would change around the time of the tax introduction and then 
level off, so we pre-specified a step-change only ITS model (i.e. without a 
post-tax trend effect for price change), following ITS best practice 
(Bernal et al., 2017). Further details are presented in Appendix Text 1. 
We conducted a sensitivity analysis using all products (i.e. including 
products which were discontinued or introduced during the study period 
and consequently had ‘missing’ observations for some time points). 
Given discrepancies between the main model and the sensitivity anal-
ysis, we conducted a post-hoc descriptive analysis of post-tax price 
trends amongst most-sold juice drink brands. 
While the tax was initially intended to become effective from August 
1, 2015, the actual implementation date was subsequently delayed to 
September 2015. In both the sales and price change analyses, we used 
the initial implementation date as the intervention timepoint, consid-
ering that companies anticipated paying the tax from this date. We 
conducted a sensitivity analysis using September 2015 as the interven-
tion date. 
3. Results 
Results of each analysis are presented below, with the corresponding 
process tracing tests summarised in Table 2. Broadly, we found evidence 
consistent with the existence of an expressive risk signalling effect 
around sodas, but not juice drinks. 
More specifically, we found evidence consistent with: consumer 
awareness of the tax (1), consumers’ belief in the health rationale for the 
tax (2), consumers’ understanding that the tax applied to sodas (3), 
consumers’ perception that sodas and juice drinks were unhealthy (4), 
and a reduction in sales of sodas (5). However, our findings reduced our 
confidence that consumers understood that the tax applied to juice 
drinks (3) or that the tax was associated with a decrease in sales of juice 
drinks (5). 
Finally, we found evidence that companies may have increased 
advertising of SSBs and introduced low-cost SSBs in response to the 
introduction of the tax, potentially undermining a signalling effect. 
In the following section, we summarise the evidence for each hy-
pothesis and then present an overall updated version of the theory in 
Fig. 6. 
3.1. Were participants aware of the tax? (1a) 
The majority of participants reported being aware of the tax. Par-
ticipants recalled specific sources of information about the tax (e.g. the 
radio, televised news), and associated the tax with the 2015 budget 
announcement (Sinckler, 2015). However, some participants were sur-
prised to learn that the tax had already come into effect: “It was 
implemented yet, though?” (Female, early 30s). 
3.2. Did popular news sources cover the tax? (1b) 
Over a third of participants referred specifically to the CBC local 
television station provider as a source of information about the SSB tax. 
When the tax was first announced in June 2015 (Sinckler, 2015), it was 
covered several times per week on the CBC Evening news. After this 
initial two-week period, the tax was not mentioned on CBC Evening 
News from July 2015-October 2016. 
Taken together, these two hoop tests suggest that it is likely that 
consumers were aware of the tax. However, lower awareness of tax 
implementation and lack of subsequent media coverage suggests that any 
potential signalling effect may have been limited to a specific period. 
3.3. Do people believe that the tax was introduced for health reasons? 
(2a) 
Participants reported several reasons for the introduction of the tax. 
Some believed that the tax was primarily about health: 
It was a deterrent to make us stop drinking so many soft drinks. […] 
(Female, early 40s) 
Other participants suggested that the tax was introduced for both 
health and revenue reasons: 
The government thought that a way to curb that [childhood obesity], plus 
make some money on the side is to implement this tax. (Female, mid-20s) 
Some participants suggested that the primary motivation for intro-
ducing the tax was to raise revenue and that the health rationale was 
used to justify the introduction of a new tax: 
I think to get more revenue and then also it has a nice wrapping, a nice 
story to say ‘oh by the way we help diabetes’ which I mean it will but… 
(Male, late 20s) 
Some participants reported that the government had acted in its own 
self-interest by taking advantage of the tax as a revenue-raising 
Table 2 
Results of empirical tests and implications.  
Hypotheses (h) Interpretation (prior → posterior) 
(1) The public is aware of the SSB tax Likely → Likely 
It seems likely that people were aware of 
the tax. 
However, there is evidence that there 
were limited reminders of the tax after 
announcement, which may have 
dampened any potential risk signal over 
time. 
(2) Members of the public believe that 
the tax was introduced for health 
reasons 
Agnostic → Very likely 
It seems very likely that at least some sub- 
groups believed the tax was introduced 
for health reasons. 
However, other sub-groups believed the 
tax was introduced because of the 
government’s interest in raising revenue, 
which may have dampened any potential 
risk signal amongst this sub-group. 
(3) Members of the public understand 
which products are taxed 
Agnostic → Very likely (for sodas) 
Agnostic → Very unlikely (for juice 
drinks) 
(4) Members of the public increase 
their perception of the health risks of 
SSBs because of the tax 
Likely → Likely (for sodas) 
None of this evidence was decisive 
enough to increase our confidence in 
whether people increased their perception 
of sodas as risky following the 
introduction of the tax. It is also possible 
that the tax may have re-enforced pre- 
existing beliefs, and we were not able to 
rule this out with existing data sources. 
However, we found no evidence to 
disconfirm this hypothesis for sodas. 
Likely → Unlikely (for juice drinks) 
For juice drinks, the media test was failed, 
reducing our confidence in this 
component of the theory. We also found 
evidence of a potentially unexpected 
effect: the tax may have incentivised 
industry to increase advertisements about 
juice drinks, which may have reduced 
public perception of the health risks of 
juice drinks. 
(5) Members of the public buy fewer 
SSBs based on new information about 
health risks (direct effect) or social 
norms (indirect effect) 
Agnostic → Agnostic (for sodas) 
While the evidence is consistent with this 
hypothesis for sodas, it is not decisive. For 
example, an alternative explanation (e.g. 
that it took time for consumers and 
markets to adjust to price changes) may 
be consistent with the observed results 
Agnostic → Very Unlikely 
The evidence disconfirms this hypothesis 
for juice drinks. 
Note: e: evidence; h: hypothesis that part of a causal mechanism exist 
M. Alvarado et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Food Policy 102 (2021) 102104
6
opportunity. 
This doubly decisive test strongly suggests that at least some (but not 
all) consumers believed that the tax was introduced for health reasons. 
3.4. Do participants perceive sodas and/or juice drinks as taxed SSBs? 
(3a) 
Almost every participant who was aware of the tax reported that it 
was applied to sodas (e.g. “…so like Sprite, Coke, Frutee, Fanta, those 
kind-a things that are colourful,” Female mid-20s). However, half of 
participants who knew about the tax reported being unsure about the 
status of juice drinks: 
I’m not sure if they went on juices as well. (Male, late teens) 
While it was not always clear if participants were referring to NAS 
juices, colloquial references to “fruit juices” often refer to juice drinks. 
To further test this, we assessed the context in which juices were dis-
cussed in the news media transcripts and found that the phrases ‘juice 
drinks’ or ‘juices’ were consistently used to refer to taxable, sugar- 
sweetened juices. 
Only a few participants identified juice drinks as taxed SSBs without 
any prompting. Others reported that juice drinks were untaxed. This 
doubly decisive test strongly suggests that consumers were aware that 
sodas were taxed but were mostly unaware that juice drinks were taxed. 
3.5. Do participants view sodas and/or juice drinks as unhealthy? (4a) 
Every participant referred to the health risks of sodas. Specific risks 
included high levels of sugar (“I guess the bad sugars would be, like, the 
carbonated drinks and stuff,” Female early-20s) and associations with 
obesity, diabetes, and chronic diseases more generally: 
Children drinking three and four sweet drinks right now. So by the time 
them reach adult, twenty-five, some of them done diabetic already. (Fe-
male, mid 40s) 
Participants demonstrated a high level of awareness of various 
health risks associated with soda consumption. In addition, a few par-
ticipants referred to exerting or experiencing peer pressure around soda 
consumption because of health-related risks: 
When you’re a big woman like myself and somebody sees you drinking a 
Coke, they’re going to think, ‘oh, you’re being irresponsible!’ (Female, 
early 40s) 
This suggests that perceptions of health risks around sodas may have 
both a direct and indirect effect (social norm enforcement), at least 
amongst some sub-groups. In comparison, only half of the participants 
referred to the health risks of juice drinks. Those that did frequently 
focused on the high sugar content of juice drinks: 
They will show you after they put them to boil and all the water evaporate, 
how much sugar is left. And the Coke and the Sprite, even the same juices 
the, they supposed to be health juices ya a big, a big clump of sugar left in 
it. (Male, early 30s) 
None of these participants linked juice drinks directly with diabetes 
or other specific health risks beyond containing high sugar levels, and no 
one referred to social norms around juices. However, some participants 
suggested that juice drinks were healthy alternatives to sodas: 
It would be more healthier on their bodies ‘cause they more would go to 
box juice [sugar-sweetened juice drinks sold in small cartons] than more 
than they would go to a Coke, a Sprite. (Female, mid 40s) 
Overall, there was decisive evidence that participants viewed sodas 
as unhealthy, passing this hoop test. There was mixed evidence around 
juices, with some (but not all) participants aware of juice drinks as un-
healthy. Even amongst this group however, the link between juices and 
specific health risks was less clear than it was for sodas. 
3.6. Do participants view sodas and/or juice drinks as unhealthy because 
of the tax? (4b) 
It was less clear whether awareness of the health risks of sodas was a 
direct result of the tax. Some participants drew comparisons between 
SSBs and cigarettes or alcohol, suggesting that SSBs were now in a 
similar conceptual category as other unhealthy products because of the 
tax: 
This is perhaps a mechanism being put in place to kind-a curb the con-
sumption of so much sugar. But they want do it with alcohol and the 
people still drinking. They want do it with cigarettes and people still 
smoking. But it is a good effort. (Female, mid-30s) 
News coverage of the SSB tax also included references to the simi-
larities between taxation on alcohol and cigarettes: 
The idea is very similar to how we treat alcohol and cigarettes in terms of 
taxing […] (CBC News, Jan 8, 2017) 
While it is not clear whether people have associated SSBs with 
alcohol and cigarettes prior to the introduction of the tax, it seems likely 
that the tax may have either introduced or re-enforced this association, 
strengthening the health risk signal. One participant suggested that the 
differential price change between sugar-sweetened and non-sugar- 
sweetened sodas caused by the tax would signal differences in health 
risk: 
That [unsweetened club soda] stays at one price but the other ones 
[regular sodas] go up, then people are obviously going to realise, alright, 
they sending us a message here. (Male, early 40s) 
One participant suggested that the tax re-enforced existing views of 
health risks of sodas but did not change existing perceptions of juice as 
healthy: 
When you think of the tax, you’re going to think soft drink, but you’re not 
going to think of the Pinehill Dairy juices that you’ve been buying your 
kids. (Female, early 40s) 
Overall, we did not find strong enough evidence to support the 
smoking gun test that people changed their views around the health 
risks of sodas because of the tax (as opposed to re-enforcing pre-existing 
views). We found no evidence that people changed their views around 
the health risks of juice drinks. 
3.7. Did news media coverage of SSBs as unhealthy increase following the 
introduction of the tax? (4c) 
News coverage clearly linking SSBs with specific health risks 
increased around the time of the tax announcement: 
Literally every home in Barbados has someone that is living with diabetes 
or they have a friend or they have a co-worker […] people are not 
educated about what and what sweet drinks can do’ (CBC News, June 26, 
2015) 
In the lead-up to the two-year review of the tax, SSBs continued to be 
portrayed as a health risk: 
A doctor at the forefront of the fight against non-communicable diseases is 
supporting a proposal for the tax on sweet drinks to be increased. (CBC 
News, April 19, 2017) 
However, no news coverage focused on health risks of juice drinks 
specifically, and local terms like “sweet drinks” were dependent on the 
public’s interpretation. Interviews with members of the public suggest 
that these vague terms are primarily understood to refer to sodas (3a). 
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3.8. Unexpected expressive consequences of the SSB tax 
Although not part of the original coding framework, it became 
apparent from reviewing the archived news transcripts that juice drinks 
were frequently portrayed on televised advertisements (ads) shown 
during CBC Evening News programming. We added additional codes 
and keyword searches to capture SSB-related advertising and summar-
ised the frequency and distribution of these ads over time in Fig. 2. 
Given the timing of the increase in these ads, it seems likely that they 
were introduced in response to the SSB tax. Ad content tended to focus 
on health benefits of specific SSBs. For example, one ad portrayed juice 
drinks as a ‘natural choice’: 
Naturally better Orchard. Time for fun, bring out the sun, nutrition so 
delicious, way less sugar, way less sugar, no artificial sweeteners. Orchard 
your natural choice. Orchard with real juice… 
The word “natural” was used to describe a sugar-sweetened juice 
drink four times in this ad. Although emphasising sugar reductions, 
Orchard juices contained 11.6 g of sugar per 100 mL as of July 2017, 
making it more sugary than regular Coca Cola which has 10.6 g of sugar 
per 100 mL. 
During interviews with participants, the word “natural” was also 
Fig. 3. Comparison of sales trends (mL/capita) for sodas and juice drinks, Barbados, 2013–2016 (re-analysis (Alvarado et al., 2017, 2019)). Note: The two upper 
panels (3A and 3B) display the unadjusted model results overlaid with the raw data. Soda sales were truncated at 150 mL/capita for ease of display. The lower panels 
(3C and 3D) display the model results adjusted for seasonality and holidays. 
Fig. 2. Frequency and distribution of sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) related advertisements shown during Caribbean Broadcast Corporation (CBC) Evening News, 
Barbados, June 2014 - July 2017. Note: Orchard is a juice drink brand, Glucerna is a meal-replacement shake targeted at diabetics and Milo is a malt-based drink. 
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Fig. 4. Price of soda and juice drinks following the introduction of the Barbados sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) tax, 2013–2016, based on products with data in 
every week of the study period (Panels A and B) and all products (Panels C and D), re-analysis (Alvarado et al., 2017, 2019). 
Fig. 5. Mean weekly cost per litre, top-selling juice drink brands, Barbados, 2013–2016, (re-analysis (Alvarado et al., 2017, 2019)).  
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used to describe juice drinks as healthy: 
I mean if it’s natural, if it’s, am, orange j, natural orange juice, or so they 
say, I, I really couldn’t see how the sugar tax would apply to that. […] I 
know they got drinks with artificial sugars and so on, but…” (Male, early 
40s) 
The association between juice drinks and “natural” may have 
confused some participants’ interpretation of which beverages were 
taxed (3a): 
Some sugar beverages are supposed to be natural, like fruit juices […] 
when I hear, when I heard about the sugar-beverage tax, I just study sweet 
drinks. […] But then when you look at it in-depth you might be, the fruit 
juices. They will tell you to let you children drink juices rather than, than 
the sweet drinks, so […] It would be a bit confusing. (Female, mid-40s) 
There is strong emergent evidence that the introduction of the 
Barbados SSB tax may have inadvertently led to an increase in SSB ad-
vertisements, which strongly implied that certain SSBs did not pose 
health risks (e.g. juice drinks). There is suggestive evidence that these 
ads may have influenced or re-enforced existing views of juice drinks as 
healthier than sodas, given the parallels between the advertising mes-
sages and participant reflections. 
3.9. Did consumers buy fewer SSBs? (5a) 
Sales of sodas decreased in the post-tax period, as shown in Fig. 3. 
On average, soda sales changed by − 3.8 mL/capita/week [95% CI 
− 4.5 to − 3.1] or − 3.5% [95% CI − 4.2 to − 2.9] compared to the esti-
mated counterfactual. By the end of the period, soda sales were 15.8% 
lower than expected in the absence of the SSB tax [95% CI 5.5 to 26.1]. 
Sales of juice drinks decreased immediately following the tax and 
then increased back to pre-tax levels. On average, juice drink sales 
changed by − 1.3 mL/capita/week [95% CI − 1.6 to − 1.0] or − 2.3% 
[95% CI − 2.8 to − 1.7] compared to the estimated counterfactual. By the 
end of the period, juice drink sales were 2.0% higher than expected in 
the absence of the SSB tax [95% CI − 4.2 to 8.3]. Sensitivity analyses 
using the September 2015 intervention date resulted in slightly larger 
estimates but did not change the sign or significance of any results. 
3.10. Do changes in price explain changes in SSB sales? (5b) 
The mean consumption-weighted cost per litre increased by 6.2% 
[95% CI 6.0 to 6.3] for sodas and increased by 9.0% [95% CI 8.8 to 9.2] 
for juice drinks (see Fig. 4, Panels A and B and Appendix Text 1 and 
Appendix Table A1). As a sensitivity analysis, we re-estimated the model 
including all products (regardless of missingness over time). The results 
were consistent for sodas but varied considerably for juice drinks. For 
juice drinks, the underlying data suggest that the mean cost per litre 
increased following the tax and then decreased to below pre-tax levels, 
as summarised in Fig. 4 Panel D. 
This sensitivity analysis suggests that the inclusion of all products 
substantially changes estimated post-tax trends in juice drink prices. To 
further explore this, we summarised mean cost per litre for each of the 
top-selling juice drink brands (which together comprise 75% of sales by 
volume). 
We found that a new brand (Suntwist) was introduced around the 
time the tax was implemented (see Fig. 5). The cost per litre of Suntwist 
was substantially lower than other top-selling brands (the average post- 
tax price of Suntwist was 25% lower than the average cost of all other 
top-selling juice brands). Sales of Suntwist were substantial and 
increased over the post-tax period, which may explain the post-tax trend 
for juice drink prices observed in the sensitivity analysis. 
Given our interest in consumers’ post-tax purchasing patterns (i.e. 
including potential purchases of newly introduced products), we focus 
on results from the sensitivity analysis for the purpose of assessing test 
5b. 
For sodas, post-tax sales did not seem to respond to price changes 
immediately (see Fig. 3C and Fig. 4C). Although there was a sharp in-
crease in soda prices around the time of the tax, soda sales remained 
statistically indistinguishable from the no-tax counterfactual until 
March 2016. We observed statistically significant reductions in soda 
sales from March 2016 onwards, despite much smaller absolute fluctu-
ations in price during this time. This provides weak evidence in favour of 
the hoop test (5b). 
In comparison, post-tax trends in sales of juice drinks do track price 
change trends closely (see Fig. 3D and Fig. 4D). Immediately following 
the tax, prices increased, and sales decreased. Subsequently, mean prices 
reverted to pre-tax level (and below) and sales increased back to pre-tax 
levels. This provides evidence against the hoop test (5b), implying that 
Fig. 6. Updated risk signalling theory based on process tracing. Note that our reported levels of confidence do not correspond to the strength of the effect, but rather 
to the level of confidence we have in each component of the theory after considering the evidence presented above. 
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the hypothesis that consumers bought fewer juice drinks because of new 
health information is unlikely (or suggesting that trends in price change 
were more important). 
3.11. Revisiting overall theory 
Our interpretation of the evidence and updated posterior beliefs are 
summarised in Table 2 and Fig. 6. 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Statement of principal findings 
Overall, we found evidence consistent with the existence of a health 
risk signalling effect following the introduction of the Barbados SSB tax 
for sodas, but not for juice drinks. We found that consumers were 1) not 
aware that the tax was applied to juice drinks and 2) unclear about the 
health risks associated with juice drinks. In addition, we found evidence 
to suggest that the introduction of the Barbados SSB tax may have 
incentivised companies to increase advertising around juice drinks as 
healthy, either re-enforcing existing confusion or counteracting any 
signalling effect around juice drinks. We also found evidence to suggest 
that at least one low-cost SSB product line was introduced around the 
time of the tax introduction, potentially undermining some of the price 
change effect of the tax. 
4.2. Strengths and limitations 
4.2.1. Related to data sources 
This study faced several limitations related to data availability. First, 
given the short timeframe between the announcement of the tax and 
implementation (three months), no baseline data on perceptions of 
different SSBs were collected. Instead, we relied on interview data 
collected 20–25 months after the implementation of the tax, limiting our 
ability to assess whether perceptions changed over time. 
Second, as with other studies that rely on self-reported data, the 
interviews that we re-analysed may have been subject to social desir-
ability bias. We identified the tests which may have been most influ-
enced by a social desirability bias (1a, 4a) and interpreted the results of 
these tests conservatively. However, the empirical tests with the most 
probative value (2a, 3a, 4b) made use of spontaneously reported de-
scriptions, which are less likely to be biased. 
Third, we were not able to access data on the viewership of CBC 
Evening News programming. However, many participants spontane-
ously identified CBC Evening News as a source of information about the 
tax (1a), increasing our confidence in using it as a proxy for news media 
coverage more broadly. Relatedly, we were only able to access 56% of 
news-days over our period of interest and it is likely that we missed some 
relevant content. To address variation over time in news-day availabil-
ity, we assessed the proportion of news-days per month rather than 
aboslute number of news-days. It is unlikely that online news-days were 
systematically missing in a way that related to SSB or tax content. 
Fourth, we faced limitations around generalizability within 
Barbados. For example, although 20 participants for the public accept-
ability interviews were identified based on age, gender, and parish of 
residence and the remaining 10 based on age (18–29 years old), our 
sample was not intended to be statistically representative and may not 
reflect views across a wider cross-section of the Barbados adult popu-
lation. Also, the data used for the price and sales analysis were from one 
supermarket chain, and may not be indicative of price and sales trends in 
other supermarket or in other retail environments (e.g. gas stations, 
restaurants, etc.) (Alvarado et al., 2017; Alvarado et al., 2019). 
4.2.2. Related to process tracing as a method 
There were several strengths and limitations related to our use of 
process tracing. First, using process tracing encouraged us to identify 
and use relevant mid-range theory (i.e. the expressive function of law 
theory (McAdams, 2015)), which allowed us to explore additional levels 
of nuance around, for example, how consumers understood the law. 
Second, process tracing provided a transparent and structured frame-
work within which to pre-specify what we would expect to find and 
critically assess the limitations of each piece of potential evidence. 
Third, process tracing allowed for inductive insights to be incorporated 
as new, hypothesised components of theory (e.g. industry responses). 
At the same time, using process tracing was very demanding in terms 
of time and data requirements. In addition, we were able to make 
stronger claims about eliminating components of the theory (i.e. 
through failed hoop tests) than we were about confirming components 
of the theory (i.e. through passed hoop tests). For example, while 
passing the hoop test about soda price and sales trends (5) provided 
weak evidence in support of the signalling hypothesis, this evidence did 
not allow us to eliminate alternative explanations which are also 
consistent with the observed evidence (e.g. consumers and markets may 
have needed time to adjust to new prices). This may be a limitation of 
the kinds of tests we were able to specify and assess, and future process 
tracing applications may benefit from specifying additional types of tests 
or narrower hoop tests. 
4.3. In relation to other studies 
4.3.1. SSB taxation 
Several other studies have assessed various components of a signal-
ling mechanism following SSB taxation, including awareness of SSB 
taxation (1) and change in purchases due to new information (5) 
(Álvarez-Sánchez et al., 2018; Capacci et al., 2017; Brockwell, 2014). At 
least two evaluations of the Mexico SSB tax explored whether people 
were aware of the tax (Álvarez-Sánchez et al., 2018; Ortega-Avila et al., 
2017). One study found that 65.2% of adults reported being aware of the 
tax (Álvarez-Sánchez et al., 2018), while a study amongst adolescents 
found that few participants were aware of the tax (Ortega-Avila et al., 
2017), suggesting that awareness may vary considerably by age. We 
were not able to assess awareness amongst adolescents in this study, but 
if a similar pattern exists in Barbados this would reduce any potential 
signalling effect amongst younger age groups. 
Other studies have either partially attributed changes in purchases to 
new information or demonstrated that price change alone does not 
explain observed trends in purchases (Capacci et al., 2017; Royo- 
Bordonada et al., 2019). For example, in a sub-national SSB tax evalu-
ation in Catalonia, Spain, participants were asked if they had changed 
their SSB consumption following the introduction of a tax (Royo-Bor-
donada et al., 2019). At least some participants (22%) reported 
“enhanced awareness of their health effects” as the primary reason for 
having changed their SSB consumption (Royo-Bordonada et al., 2019). 
However, these results may have been influenced by the study design or 
social desirability bias. In comparison, we specified intermediary steps 
and used sales data instead of self-reported data to assess whether pur-
chases changed following tax introduction. 
An evaluation of the SSB tax in France (which targeted both SSBs and 
artificially sweetened beverages) demonstrated that purchases of SSBs 
decreased even though prices did not change (e.g. the tax was not passed 
on to consumers) (Capacci et al., 2017). At the same time, purchases of 
ASBs increased despite tax-driven price increases (Capacci et al., 2017). 
The authors suggest that this discrepancy is evidence of a signalling 
effect (Capacci et al., 2017). They relied on a similar test to the one we 
used (5b), but were able to draw stronger conclusions than we were (i.e. 
having two failed hoop tests allowed them to draw stronger inferences). 
Overall, while some studies have assessed various components of the 
theory we considered here, we are not aware of any studies which have 
assessed these components collectively in the context of SSB taxation. 
4.3.2. Other excise taxes 
A number of other studies have assessed the signalling effect of 
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different types of excise taxes (Brockwell, 2014; , 2019; Tiezzi and 
Verde, 2019; Licari and Meier, 2000). For example, Licari and Meier 
focused on tobacco taxation and used longitudinal data on cigarette 
packs consumed per capita by U.S. state from 1955 to 1996. They found 
that, by the mid-1990 s, the impact of a tax-driven signalling effect was 
almost as large as the impact of changes in price. They also demon-
strated that this signalling effect was lower in tobacco-producing states, 
whose populations they suggest may be less swayed by government 
signals about the health risks of tobacco (Licari and Meier, 2000). While 
they controlled for national policy changes (e.g. advertising bans and 
warning labels, which may also have signalling effects), they did not 
control for state-level tobacco control policies which may have coin-
cided with tax changes, potentially confounding the results. Give our 
single case study design, we were not able to use their approach and 
instead examined the theoretical mechanisms through which a signal-
ling effect may operate to assess a similar hypothesis. 
Finally, Tiezzi and Verde assessed gasoline taxation and found that a 
gasoline tax has an additional impact on demand, beyond the impact of 
the tax-inclusive price change (Tiezzi and Verde, 2019). Consumers who 
were aware that price had changed because of a tax (and not due to other 
market fluctuations) were observed to reduce demand more than those 
who are unaware of the tax (Tiezzi and Verde, 2019). The authors 
suggest this is consistent with the hypothesis that the tax signalled a 
more permanent price change, implying a higher sustained cost of gas-
oline consumption. Tiezzi and Verde highlighted that this signalling 
effect may produce a more regressive outcome, with higher-income 
households more likely to respond to the additional signal (Tiezzi and 
Verde, 2019). 
This suggests that taxes may produce multiple kinds of signals 
(permanence of price changes, health risks, etc.) A greater awareness of 
the health risks associated with SSB consumption may raise the antici-
pated future costs of current SSB consumption (the internalities of SSB 
consumption). In the future it would be useful to consider the extent to 
which anticipated future costs (direct and indirect costs) impact current 
SSB consumption, following Becker and Murphy’s rationale addiction 
theory (Becker and Murphy, 1988). 
4.4. Meaning of the study 
We found suggestive evidence that there was a signalling effect 
around sodas, but no clear signalling effect around juice drinks. This 
may have been in part because 1) juice drinks were not understood to be 
taxed, 2) juice drinks were viewed as healthier than sodas (amongst 
some), and 3) advertising messages (introduced after the tax) emphas-
ised the healthiness of juice drinks. These factors may have re-enforced 
each other. 
4.5. Policy implications 
There are several broader policy implications that are relevant to all 
jurisdictions considering implementing SSB taxes, or strengthening 
existing ones. First, the ways in which consumers interpret a tax (in 
particular, which products they understand a tax is applied to) may have 
important implications for the effectiveness of an SSB tax. If this is the 
case, policymakers, journalists, and health advocates need to be clear 
about the definition of terms like “sugar-sweetened beverages” and 
“taxed drinks” and communicate these clearly with the public. 
Second, even when a tax is introduced for non-health reasons, it may 
have a signalling effect if public health groups take advantage of the 
opportunity to tout health risks (Licari and Meier, 2000). The intro-
duction or amendment of additional SSB taxes for non-health reasons 
may nevertheless provide strategic opportunities for public health ad-
vocates to focus their messaging and amplify the risk signalling potential 
of any tax change. 
Third, introducing or enhancing marketing restrictions may amplify 
the effect of SSB taxes by reducing ‘strategic’ counter-signalling effects 
led by industry, particularly around drinks with an existing perception 
of healthiness. In addition, co-interventions such as front-of-package 
warning labels may help to reduce confusion around what is a taxed 
beverage and may re-enforce signalling effects when combined with a 
tax. 
4.6. Process tracing 
From a methodological perspective, process tracing may be useful 
when research questions involve testing a theory, rather than assessing 
the strength of an association, and when the object of study is a large- 
scale intervention (White and Phillips, 2012). While process tracing 
guidance centres around developing a linear causal pathway, we suggest 
that PT could also be used to test components of a more complex non- 
linear theory. 
We suggest that PT may be most valuable, from a public health 
perspective, when it is used to test causal mechanisms which are less 
well understood and may be readily intervened upon (e.g. policy-related 
mechanisms). Finally, while process tracing is not intended to produce 
generalisable conclusions (Beach and Process-Tracing, 2019), we sug-
gest that the updated theory that process tracing produces may be 
analytically generalizable (Yin, 2013) and can be applied to the evalu-
ation of similar policy interventions in other settings. 
4.7. Unanswered questions and future research 
In the future, it would be useful to assess the extent to which various 
SSB taxes have operated through a signalling effect and evaluate the 
impact of variation in signalling strength on changes in SSB sales or 
consumption. Variation in signalling may be due to how a tax is intro-
duced (Alsukait et al., 2019; Le Bodo et al., 2017; Purtle et al., 2017; 
Donaldson, 2015; Le Bodo et al., 2019; Thow et al., 2011), media 
coverage of a tax (Cornelsen and Smith, 2018; Singh-Lalli, 2015; 
Buckton et al., 2019), co-interventions introduced alongside a tax 
(Taillie et al., 2020), heterogenous industry reactions (Salgado and Ng, 
2019) or contextual factors. Finally, future research around signalling 
effects could investigate whether there is evidence of variation by sub- 
groups (e.g. by social class (Smed et al., 2007), age, or habitual con-
sumption level (Li and Dorfman, 2019), which may have an impact on 
the distributional consequences of SSB taxation. 
5. Conclusions 
We demonstrated that the available evidence is consistent with a 
health risk signalling effect for sodas following the introduction of the 
Barbados SSB tax, but not for juice drinks. We found suggestive evidence 
that some companies may have increased advertising around the 
healthiness of juice drinks following the introduction of the tax, which 
may have re-enforced or increased this confusion around juice drinks. 
We suggest that introducing SSB taxes along with related co- 
interventions (e.g. front-of-package warning labels, marketing re-
strictions) may amplify any potential signalling effects by clarifying the 
health risks associated with specific SSBs. 
We build on the expressive function of law theory to describe how a 
signalling effect may operate following the introduction of an SSB tax 
and present a refined version of this theory which may be useful for 
evaluations of SSB taxes in other settings. Finally, we found that 
applying theory-testing process tracing was a useful approach, with 
potential applications across an increased range of public health policy 
evaluations. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Text 1: Price change ITS 
First, we conducted a simple ITS analysis, using all products with non-missing data over the period from January 2013 to October 2016, separately 
for sodas and juice drinks. We anticipated that prices would change around the time of the tax introduction and then level off, so we pre-specified a 
step-change only ITS model (i.e. without a post-tax trend effect for price change), following ITS best practice (Bernal et al., 2017). When the tax was 
initially announced (on June 15th, 2015), it was intended to be introduced on August 1, 2015. However, the implementation date was delayed to 
September 2015. In this analysis, we have used the initial effective date (August 1, 2015), considering that companies would have anticiapted having 
to pay the tax from this date. However, we display the announcement and actual implementation dates for reference (dashed lines). 
To specify the dependent variable, we calculated the consumption-weighted mean weekly log-transformed cost per litre separately for sodas and 
juice drinks. We used the log-transformed cost per litre since the Barbados SSB tax is an ad valorem tax and we were primarily interested in the percent 
change in price following the introduction of the tax, rather than the absolute price change. The cost per litre was consumption-weighted to prevent 
products which are rarely purchased from skewing the analysis. We used the model described in Equation 1: 
Equation 1: Price interrupted time series model 
Consumption weighted mean ln(cost per liter)wy ∼ β1− 11Mm + β12Trendwy + β13Taxwy + β14CPImy + εwy 
where M corresponds to monthly indicators to take into account seasonality, Trend corresponds to the overall linear trend in cost per litre over the 
whole period, Tax corresponds to an indicator for the post-tax period and CPI corresponds to the consumer price index (to account for inflation). The 
coefficient on Tax is the coefficient of interest, and 100*(exp(β13)-1) corresponds to the mean estimated percentage change in prices. We summarised 
the coefficients from this model for sodas and juice drinks in Appendix Table A1, and plot the data and model predictions in Fig. 4A and 3B. 
As a sensitivity analysis, we re-estimated both models using all available data per week. However, based on visual inspection it was clear that it the 
step-change ITS model was not appropriate for juice drinks (see Fig. 4D). 
This highlights the impact that excluding products based on missingness over time may have on price change results. To investigate this further, we 
focused on the top-selling brands for juice drinks (defined by reviewing the top-selling individual products which collectively made up 75% of total sales by 
volume). We plotted the mean cost per litre by brand over time to descriptively assess whether any top-selling products were introduced or discontinued 
during this period. 
As demonstrated in Fig. 5, at least one major brand was introduced around the same time of the tax introduction. This brand (Suntwist) was 1) 
popular and 2) low-priced, relative to other juice drinks. The introduc-
tion of Suntwist products decreased the average cost per litre faced by 
consumers, reducing the price impact of the tax on juice drinks. 
Importantly, Suntwist juice drinks have the same amount of sugar (11.6 
g/100 mL) (SunTwist Apple Cherry Fruit Drink, 2020) as other juice 
drinks or sodas (i.e. a higher sugar concentration than regular Coca Cola 
at 10.6 g/100 mL). 
Table A1 
Post-tax change (%) in average weekly cost per litre (consumption weighted by 
sales volume).  
SSB Type Products (#) Coef. 95% CI 
Soda 54 6.2% 6.0% 6.3% 
Juice Drinks 48 9.0% 8.8% 9.2% 
Note: Regression coefficients and 95% CIs were back-transformed to the original 
scale using (exp(β13)-1*100) to estimate mean percentage change. 
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Appendix Text 2: Media Transcripts 
For a summary of the media transcripts included, see Appendix Fig. A1 
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